Author: Herbut Józef Title: DIRECTIONS AND PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (Filozofia religii: jej problematyka i jej odmiany) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.15, number: 2011/4, pages: 911-917 Keywords: PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION, DEFINITION OF RELIGION, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The main task of the philosophy of religion is to adequately define the concept of religion – it (...) should be comprehensive enough to cover all historically known forms of religion and restrictive enough to exclude any other cultural forms which are only similar to religion. How we understand the nature of religious beliefs (their propositional, volitional and emotional content) determines the method of philosophizing about religion. The religious doctrine plays a decisive role in religion, in one way or another motivating and justifying moral norms and worship practices. Traditionally oriented philosophers of religion have been chiefly interested in reasons for accepting a religious doctrine and in metaphysical problems; analytical philosophy of religion has brought into focus the semiotics of religious propositions. (shrink)

Fr. Józef Kożuchowski Rationality and Faith in God: the Robert Spaemann’s ApproachThis article traces three threads of philosophical thinking of one of the most illustrious German thinkers today which relate to the issue of rationality of faith in God. The first question addresses the conviction that faith itself appears to be a rational act, which is why it is no accident that science has never deployed any major agreement against it. Therefore, the alternative of science or faith is ruled (...) out, since accepting it would be tantamount to abandoning the complementary understanding of reality. Thus faith not only is not contradictory in itself nor irrational; instead, it even enhances, complements, and enriches the cognition, allows to perceive the facets of reality not encompassed by scientific methods (its final cause, what it is in essence, purpose of existence, accidentality), dispels the illusions of the so-called scientific outlook, or scientism, reveals our dignity, and contributes to its growth. The significance of Spaemann’s thought is also apparent in the context of two influential approaches in our culture which, as “superstitions of modernity” (Wittgenstein), cannot be accepted: the enlightenment approach, which considered revealed faith doubtful, and the scientistic one, which assigns cognitive value only to natural sciences. The second question pertains to the relationship of faith in God with our reason and its cognitive abilities. Spaemann illustrates it on the example of Nietzsche’s approach, according to which there is an inseparable link between the two. One is not possible without the other. The third aspect of the analysed issue takes the form of Spaemann’s original argumentation, emphasising the rationality of our faith in God, in which the German thinker relates to grammar, while the argumentation itself is a postulate of theoretical reason. Keywords: faith, rationality, science, Robert Spaemann, Friedrich Nietzsche, futurum exactum. (shrink)

ROBERT SPAEMANN’S NEW APPROACH TO THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF THE PERSON The article is concerned with the subject of the person, which constitutes the core of anthropological reflections of the eminent German thinker, Robert Spaemann. The issue of the person was especially noticeable in one of his most important works entitled Personen. This issue generated a keen interest and recognition of specialists in many countries. These reflections are based on the metaphysical concept of human existence. That is why Spaemann’s theory (...) of the person is often defined as metaphysics of the person. First, in the introduction, the author points to the significance of the issue; second, he describes its most important threads: understanding the person, the person’s identity and traits such as rationality, freedom, intentionality, love, religiousness, transcendence, ability to forgive, to keep one’s promise and to speak. The next part of the article presents the issues of the person’s self-fulfilment, indestructibility, being the subject of law, having a special status, i.e. dignity. Readers also learn why the classical vision of the person (Boethius, Thomas Aquinas, Kant) is not outdated, whereas Locke’s theory (as well as its radicalised version propagated by its well-known supporters, Parfit, Hoerster, Singer) remains unacceptable as contradictory in itself. As has been emphasized, it involves some false anthropological assumptions, e.g. the issue of the so-called potential person and the difference between human life and person’s life. However, the latter theory is increasingly popular at present since it supports, among others, the justifiability of abortion and euthanasia, and it suits the contemporary mentality with a definitely hedonist overtone. Many of Spaemann’s views on the person are truly significant and innovative. The issue that Spaemann himself regards as particularly important is his response to the false ideas of Locke and his contemporary continuators. The eminent scholar not only reveals the logical incoherence of this thought and its deviation from common sense, but using unique linguistic and transcendental-pragmatic argumentation, he proves that human is a person, i.e. “someone”, since the moment of conception. Thus, we cannot be thought of as if we had been “something” at first. That is why, not accidentally, the subtitle of Spaemann’s most important book on anthropology, i.e. Personen, is The difference between “someone” and “something”. In this response to Locke’s false theory (and its supporters), he explains that one cannot talk about such a distinction in the case of human beings. The second innovative issue in Spaemann’s work is the defence of the classical concept of the person and expressing it in a new way. The third one is his attempt at overcoming both spiritualistic and naturalistic perception of the human being. The fourth is Spaeman’s observation that our ability to forgive and to keep promises should be treated as a significant trait of the person. The article presents also some aspects of Spaemann’s vision of the person which have not been the subject of analyses yet, neither in the Polish nor in the Western literature, e.g. characteristics of the person, the person being the subject of laws and the person’s special status (ontological and moral dignity). Keywords: ROBERT SPAEMANN, THEORY OF THE PERSON, ONTOLOGICAL DIGNITY, MORAL DIGNITY. (shrink)

Belief is a mental state, its content being the statement of a certain state of affairs. With respect to the manner they arise, we divide beliefs into spontaneous and reflexive. When we take into consideration their bases, we speak about basic beliefs and beliefs derived from others. The terms “spontaneous belief” and “basic belief” have various meanings, but they are equivalent with regard to their range. Contemporary religious spontaneous and basic beliefs have various forms. In the Christian religion we speak, (...) among other things, about numinous beliefs, as described by R. Otto, and A. Plantinga’s properly basic beliefs. According to Otto, numinous experiences (of that which is tremendum et fascinans) are a source of firm beliefs for man, i.e. he has had contacts with some objective manifestations of divinity. Plantinga (whose thinking belongs to a more “naturalistic” strain) writes about properly basic beliefs, such that arise spontaneously in man (if he is not depraved by sinful life) who remains under respective circumstances. Such beliefs are the grounds for theistic derivative beliefs. The arguments for the truthfulness of the beliefs of the first and second type bring forth a series of questions, and they are constantly discussed by philosophers of religion. (shrink)

In his Logic of Religion (1965) Bocheński presumed that: (1) ‘religion’ denotes a system of propositions of religious contents, (2) man becomes an advocate of a certain religion through an acceptance of its meta-dogma, i.e. a statement that the creed of this religion is true. In his article Religious Hypothesis Revised [in: P. Weingartner (ed.), Scientific and Religious Belief, Dordrecht 1994, 142-160] Bocheński writes that the concept of religion assumed in the Logic is wrong. Our experience shows that the conversion (...) of a man who previously was an unbeliever may occur in two steps: first, he accepts several elementary propositions about God. They constitute ‘basic faith’ (that God exists that He governs the events in the world, etc.). Then we have a collection of propositions that compose “the confession of faith” of a given religion. The religious hypothesis is applied, above all, when we accept a system. It is doubtful whether it can be used in the basic faith. In this paper, the author discusses first various forms of religious experience that inspires the basic faith: (1) a religious interpretation of secular phenomena; (2) an experience of sacrum in the world; (3) an ‘encounter’ of Transcendence. Then he presents a new version of this hypothesis: what kind of experience that some persons have accounts for religion and whether it permits to predict their new experiences or even new events. (shrink)

The idea of the moral good is considered a desirable and appreciated real existence. With reference to teachers it constitutes a personal pattern of judicious acting. Their special task is not only to teach necessary knowledge to students but also to instil moral conduct in them i.e. to form ‘a correct character’. This notion was present at the beginning of the 20th century and is also reflected in Archbishop Józef Bilczewski’s letter ‘The Character’ (1920). The ideas presented there remain (...) still valid also in the present historic moment of the nation. (shrink)

Jozef Keulartz and Gilbert Leistra (eds): Legitimacy in European Nature Conservation Policy: Case Studies in Multilevel Governance Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s10806-010-9248-4 Authors Sarah Beach, Kansas State University Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work Manhattan KS USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863.

Tekst jest poświęcony pamięci Księdza Antoniego Siemianowskiego (1930-2022) — profesora filozofii, absolwenta Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego. Artykuł jest najszerszym dotąd opracowaniem życiorysu Księdza Profesora Siemianowskiego wraz z prześledzeniem jego poglądów filozoficznych — zbiera dotychczasowe publikacje dotyczące Księdza Profesora i dokonuje ich syntezy. Autor miał zamiar wskazać na najważniejsze momenty z życia duchownego-filozofa, który zapisał się w pamięci przestrzeni akademickich Kujaw i Wielkopolski — najbardziej w Inowrocławiu, z którego pochodził, a także Gniezna, z którym był związany poprzez pracę wykładowcy, przez ponad pół (...) wieku. Tekst analizuje drogę intelektualną Księdza Profesora od edukacji szkolnej, poprzez studia filozoficzno-teologiczne, studia doktoranckie, a w końcu poszukiwanie „własnej drogi w filozofii” — drogi od historii filozofii, poprzez tomizm do fenomenologii. Zwrócić należy uwagę, że Ksiądz Siemianowski nie zajmował się jedynie pracą naukową, ale był także jako prezbiter katolicki duszpasterzem, który także poprzez nauczanie pokoleń przyszłych kapłanów formował w nich styl myślenia, zgodnie z zasadą, że „filozofia jest służebnicą teologii”. Inną przestrzenią aktywności Księdza Siemianowskiego była publicystyka — nawiązawszy współpracę z wieloma czasopismami, popularyzował na ich łamach wiedzę z zakresu etyki, filozofii kultury czy antropologii filozoficznej. (shrink)

Dotychczasowe, nie tylko polskie, opracowania filozofii człowieka, z którymi spotykamy się w dziełach Ferdynanda Ebnera i ks. Józefa Tischnera, jedynie sporadycznie sygnalizują znaczenie antropologiczne i metafizyczne związku słowa i miłości. Tymczasem, w moim przekonaniu, związek ten jest bardzo ważny w przedstawionym przez tych dwóch filozofów źródłowym rozumieniu ludzkiego istnienia jako wydarzania się prawdy bycia człowieka. Dlatego w niniejszym opracowaniu koncentruję się właśnie na opisie tego związku, na tym, jak on funkcjonuje w myśleniu dialogicznym tych dwóch filozofów. Z filozoficznego punktu widzenia (...) jest on godny uwagi przede wszystkim z tej racji, że pokazuje jak tętni życiem filozofia człowieka w swym metafizycznym wymiarze. Inaczej mówiąc, więź słowa i miłości pokazuje, jak istnieje dialogicznie ugruntowana metafizyka człowieka w jej wydarzeniowym charakterze. Słowo i miłość żyją w człowieku jak obiektywne, a zarazem subiektywne, czyli podmiotowe wyrazy jego duchowego życia. Poświęcając uwagę tej problematyce, wskazałem nie tylko na podobieństwa antropologii tych dwóch filozofów, lecz wykazałem przede wszystkim, że wyeksponowana przez nich więź słowa i miłości stanowi ważny klucz do odnowienia źródłowego myślenia o człowieku w dobie zachwiania się pewności tego, co najbardziej podstawowe w jego życiu. (shrink)

W swej pracy ks. Józef Bremer SJ zajmuje się problematyką relacji zachodzącej pomiędzy ciałem umysłem. Pytanie o ty relacji znane jest w literaturze - głównie angielsko-amerykańskiej - pod nazwą problem psychofizyczny. W dyskusji nt. tego problemu liczy się nazwisko amerykańskiego filozofa Wilfrida Sellarsa. Sellars reprezentuje materialistyczny lub, jak się ją czysto nazywa w fachowym języku filozoficznym, naturalistyczną czy fizykalną koncepcją umysłu.

Stanisław Kamiński (1919-1986) was a philosopher, philosopher of science and historian of science. He defended in 1949 at the Catholic University in Lublin (KUL) his PhD thesis on Frege's axiomatic system of the sentence logic in the light of the contemporary methodology of deductive science. Since 1957 he was the head of the Chair of Methodology (the first one in Poland, founded in 1952 by J. Iwanicki) at the KUL, since 1965 the associate and since 1970 the full professor of (...) KUL. He was for many years the dean of the Faculty of Philosophy KUL where he developed the methodological foundations of the »Lublin-school of philosophy«. The main interests of S. Kamiński (1919-1986) was history of science and logic, general and special methodology, methodology of philosophy and (medieval) semiotics. Himself he saw his main achievements in the domain of the theory of science and the methodology of classical philosophy, especially in the studies of the method and language of metaphysics; he gave a methodological description of general metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, ethics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of history and studies on religion (religiology); he investigated the beginnings of the mathematical induction in the Middle Ages and in modern times, modern history of the theory of definition (Th. Hobbes, B. Pascal, J. Locke, E. B. de Condillac, J. D. Gergonne), the theory of argumentation (reasoning), the structure and the evolution of scientific theory, the deductive method (B. Pascal, G. W. Leibniz, G. Frege), the achievements of logic and philosophy in Poland. A characteristic feature of S. Kamiński's philosophical and methodological approach was a specific historicism, consisting of referring to the heritage of the past and at the same time to the latest achievements in logic and philosophy of science. He looked to history for inspiration, for how to solve his own problems and for a partial confirmation of legitimacy of his answers. He also used history to better understand the context of the discussed problems. His methodological interests are characterized by a philosophical and historical approach. He had a broad concept of knowledge and was maximalist both in raising questions and in giving answers. He cultivated the ideal of rational knowledge. In accordance with classical philosophy he saw the substance of person as ens rationale, a being realizing himself in a disinterested search for a theoretical truth, whose highest expression is philosophy. He stressed the epistemological and methodological plurality of knowledge and distinguished (with Kant) a material and formal part of knowledge, assuming that the formal element manifests itself as the logical form in the formal procedures of the (scientific) cognitive processes, that is in the (scientific) method and the (scientific) language. Making many attempts at a methodological characterization of different types of cognition and knowledge he distinguished – besides commonsense knowledge that lies at the bottom of any other type of knowledge – the scientific, philosophical and theological knowledge. None of them can be reduced to other type of knowledge, because each of them has its own problems, goals and methods. At the top there is a kind of sapiential knowledge which is much more than a simple generalization of all particular kinds of knowledge. S. Kamiński indebted his understanding of science to contemporary philosophy and to the classical philosophy. The nature of science was determined by him from the point view of its subject matter, aims, methods, logical structure and genesis. The question of what science is concerned with, i.e. what is its subject matter, is a philosophical question, it presupposes an appropriate understanding of the nature of the world. S. Kamiński opted for a pluralistic approach to the world: the principal object of science is the objective world but so are subjective states of man and products of his mind and his language. The best diagnostic test of the scientific character of science is the scientific method. Also here – rejecting the scientism (i.e. the view, that the scientific method and knowledge is the pattern and the measure of each knowledge) – S. Kamiński takes a pluralistic attitude. Accepting that the scientific method is not simple, that there is not one uncomplicated ideal way of doing science, and that because of the multiplicity of questions and scientific aims it would be difficult to construct one universal scientific method as a uniform set of rules for every kind of science, S. Kamiński assumes that different subject matter and different goals of scientific cognition require different research strategies and types of cognitive procedures. One manifestation of S. Kamiński's methodological pluralism is his antinaturalistic position in the theory of the humanities where he supported the thesis of their methodological autonomy with regard to natural sciences. Closer to the philosophical cognition and knowledge, the humanities do not meet and can not meet the conditions imposed upon the natural sciences, as they differ from them in subject matter (the world of culture) and hence in method (understanding, interpretation) used. The publications of S. Kamiński include over 350 positions. During his life he published three books: Georgonne'a teoria definicji [Georgonne's Theory of Definition], Lublin 1958; Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk [Concept of Science and Classification of Sciences], Lublin 1961, 19813; and [together with M. A. Krąpiec] Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki [On the Theory and Methodology of Metaphysics], Lublin 1962. After his death five volumes of Collected Papers have been published: vol. I: Jak filozofować? [How to Philosophize? Studies in Methodology of Classical Philosophy], edited by Tadeusz Szubka, Lublin 1989; vol. II: Filozofia i metoda. Studia z dziejów metod filozofowania [Philosophy and Method. Studies from the History of the Method of Philosophizing], edited by Józef Herbut, Lublin 1993; vol. III: Metoda i język. Studia z semiotyki i metodologii nauk [Method and Language. Studies in Semiotics and Philosophy of Science], edited by Urszula Żegleń, Lublin 1994; vol. IV: Nauka i metoda. Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk [Science and Method. Concept of Science and Classification of Sciences], edited by Andrzej Bronk, Lublin 1992); vol. V: Światopogląd - Religia - Teologia [Worldview - Religion - Theology], edited by Monika Walczak and Andrzej Bronk, Lublin 1998. (shrink)

Artykuł został poświęcony dziewiętnastowiecznym opisom z podróży przedstawiającym Cypr. Dotyczy przede wszystkim polskich autorów, choć we wstępnej części uwzględniono również teksty Alphonse’a de Lamartine’a, François-Renégo de Chateaubrianda Géramba, które zaistniały na rodzimym gruncie w tłumaczeniu, inspirując również polskich podróżników. W wieku pary i elektryczności, podobnie jak i we wcześniejszym stuleciu, Cypr rzadko kiedy był głównym celem wyprawy, odgrywając najczęściej rolę przystanku na długiej trasie pielgrzymkowej do Ziemi Świętej. Z tego też względu znajomość wyspy ograniczała się jedynie do Larnaki. Wśród polskich (...) pielgrzymów XIX wieku, których statek przybijał do cypryjskiego wybrzeża, a swój pobyt na wyspie uwzględnili w swych relacjach, wspomnieniach z podróży do Ziemi Świętej, znaleźli się: ks. Ignacy Hołowiński (1839), Stanisław Tarnowski (1857–1858), ks. Feliks Gondek (1859), ks. Marcin Tyburcy (ok. 1860), Ignacy Żagiell (1863–1868), ks. Józef Pelczar wraz z ks. Kazimierzem Dorszewskim (1872), ks. Tadeusz Kegel (1872), Adam Sierakowski (1883). Ich opisy i wrażenia zostały podane analizie w niniejszym artykule. (shrink)

Autor prezentuje mało znane fakty z historii polskiej nauki świadczące o tym, że przedstawiciele polskiej emigracji powojennej mieli bardzo dobre rozeznanie o sytuacji w nauce krajowej. W filozofii przykładem tego były kontakty Zbigniewa Jordana (1911–1977) z przedstawicielami filozofii pracującymi w kraju. Jordan przez wiele lat utrzymywał systematyczne kontakty z około czterdziestoma osobami, stanowiącymi elitę polskiej powojennej filozofii i socjologii. Do grona jego znajomych i korespondentów należeli m.in. Jan Łukasiewicz, ks. Józef Pastuszka, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Maria i Stanisław Ossowscy, Tadeusz i (...) Janina Kotarbińscy, Adam Schaff, Leszek Kołakowski, Jan Szczepański, Andrzej Grzegorczyk, a także przedstawiciele polskiej emigracji pracujący na uczelniach zachodnich. Dzięki tym kontaktom potrafił zrealizować naraz dwa cele. Po pierwsze, popularyzował godne upamiętnienia osiągnięcia nauki polskiej, dzięki czemu jego starania zapewniały ścisły związek między nauką krajową a światową. Po drugie, zapewniał historyczna ciągłość nauki polskiej, której nie przerwało nawet wprowadzenie komunistycznych porządków w kraju, które sprowadzały się do próby odrzucenia całej dotychczasowej tradycji. Autor stoi na stanowisku, że nauka stanowi najważniejszą część kultury i z tej racji dokonania Jordana powinny zostać spopularyzowane w całym środowisku nauki w Polsce jako przykład, którym winni kierować się jej młodzi adepci, koncentrujący się wyłącznie na karierze w zagranicznych instytucjach naukowych. (shrink)

Artykuł poświęcony jest charakterystyce kulturowego tła manifestu koła krakowskiego i jego zespołu, który stanowili: Józef Maria Bocheński OP, Jan Franciszek Drewnowski, ks. Jan Salamucha oraz Bolesław Sobociński, i który był wspierany przez Jana Łukasiewicza i ks. Konstantego Michalskiego. Manifestem koła była aplikacja programu szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej do katolickiej teologii i filozofii. W tym przedsięwzięciu szczególną rolę odegrała Łukasiewicza wersja programu. Do zastosowanych środków należały: odnowienie języka tak, aby spełniał on wszystkie warunki właściwego dyskursu naukowego, recepcja logiki matematycznej, uwspółcześnienie semiotyki i (...) metodologii oraz wykorzystanie metod formalnych. Analizowane są cztery grupy okoliczności będące środowiskiem koła krakowskiego: esprit de l’époque, sytuacja w filozofii, sytuacja w logice i sytuacja w teologii – na początku XX wieku – w bezpośrednim związku z decydującymi działaniami czterech założycieli koła. (shrink)

Compendium of the basic tenets of the Mīmāṃsā philosophy.

v. 1. Translation -- v. 2. Roman and Sanskrit texts.

Compendium of the Mimamsa school in Indic philosophy.

Compendium of the Mimamsa school in Indic philosophy.

Fr. Tomasz Czernik Charles Taylor’s Concept of Self-identitySelf-identity, according to Charles Taylor, comes from the community, especially through intersubjective communication. Self-awareness develops from contact with other people. The subject enters this way a moral dimension and public space. On this basis, he can talk about himself because he can describe himself in a social context. The self-identity is represented and conditioned over time. Its stability is rooted in social cohesion, which is based on culture. In the absence of such consistency, (...) there is a modernist and romantic tendency in society. Keywords: Self-identity, Charles Taylor, society, community. (shrink)

The paper addresses the following question: why do human beings, on Aristotle’s view, have an innate tendency to badness, that is, to developing desires that go beyond, and often against, their natural needs? Given Aristotle’s teleological assumptions (including the thesis that nature does nothing in vain), such tendency should not be present. I argue that the culprit is to be found in the workings of rationality. In particular, it is the presence of theoretical reason that necessitates the limitless nature of (...) human non-rational desires. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the widely held view that Aristotle's vicious agent is a principled follower of a wrong conception of the good whose soul, just like the soul of the virtuous agent, is marked by harmony between his reason and non-rational desires is an exegetical mistake. Rather, Aristotle holds – consistently and throughout the Nicomachean Ethics – that the vicious agent lacks any real principles of action and that his soul lacks unity and harmony even more than (...) the soul of the uncontrolled agent. (shrink)

I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desire that has as its object the very thing that one reasons about how to promote. This feature distinguishes practical from productive reasoning since in the latter the desire that initiates it is not (unless incidentally) a desire for the object that one productively reasons about. The feature has several interesting consequences: (a) there is only a contingent relationship between the desire that one practically reasons (...) about how to satisfy and the action one decides on; (b) practical thinking and action cannot be separated from the agent, whereas productive thinking and production can be outsourced to someone else. The view has consequences also for the distinction between action and production. Finally, I illustrate the usefulness and correctness of my account of practical thinking by using it to shed new light on Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous agent must decide on her virtuous actions ‘for themselves’. (shrink)

Where you have freedom, the meaning of the word increases, where the word is meaningful, you presuppose freedom." Józef Tischner.